

Making, Agency, Action, Artifice

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Human life, from Genesis to the Gross National Product, is about making and agency and action that lead us to having stuff. Human beings are concerned about making themselves, making others, making stuff, making others make stuff, make stuff that makes more stuff. The measure of the man is how many toys he has, how much money he makes, how much agency he commands, how much power he has to make others make stuff for him; that is, one's stuff is what it is all about. Money is both a measure and an exchange of our making, our agency, our power, our wealth, our self-worth. The question, "how much does she make?" is to invoke a medium that embraces all these related terms. What is the current most important issue in the US state and federal governments? How to care for the poor and the ill? How to end global warming? How to end multiple wars? How to improve education? No, it is how to pay for the stuff we have already bought. In the words of that great song in "Cabaret," "money makes the world go round, the world go round, the world go round."

To attend to these things is nothing new, yet, every time I read Elaine Scarry's book, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*,¹ I am surprised at how deeply making and unmaking are related to the human body and how long this relationship has existed. It is fascinating to think about how all making is, according to Scarry, in some important sense, motivated by some lack of the body, by some projection of the body into the world beyond the body.² And thus the motivation, the agency, for making rests in part on pain, on a desire to alleviate pain and discomfort. I was once fairly persuaded by this argument, but I currently feel that we need to seriously rethink this view. It is a crazy insight to recognize that all made things are, in some sense, patterned on the body or at least our idea of what a body should be. It is important that we realize that in making stuff, we are remaking ourselves. I find insightful Scarry's discussion of the hinge effect of made things. We make things as projections from our bodies or our image of what our bodies should be. These made things, standing seemingly independent of us in the world outside our bodies, then return the favor, exercising an agency projected on them to remake us. We must spend some quality time reflecting on the multiplier and exchange effect of made things. The energy and effort required to make a thing is multiplied by its impact on us and those around us as it hinges back to show us what we did. Scarry's analysis of the potential impact of the small effort and movement required to pull the trigger of a gun is far out of proportion to the impact the fired gun has on the world. Of course, to make a gun from the inception of the idea of such a device through a history of development and design and manufacture and distribution is a long and complex one, yet we can see that in making there is often a powerful multiplication of the hinged return.

¹ Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 284-88.

In the evolution of human beings, the development of the thumb is, as Friedrich Engels noted,³ of critical importance. Without a thumb, we cannot easily hold tools to make things to have and exchange. The thumb is surely also the inspiration for all our interest in holding, grasping, clasping, handedness, specialization (even of our brain hemispheres), weapons, and handshakes. We measure value in terms of the direction of the thumb—thumb up is winner, down is loser. Ethologists and evolutionists have long known the opposing thumb a distinctive mark of humans. I'll return to the thumb later. And, I'll want to say something about an understanding of making based on movement and gesture that rests more in the hand and develops from André Leroi-Gourhan's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's work.

Scarry's location of making in Jewish and Christian biblical literature is fascinating and actually jarring, I think. The biblical passages of god making the world and human beings; the passages of human beings making images of god and "his" response; all seem rather shocking in the degree to which the making and unmaking of the body is involved. I find it rather surprising to think about how extensively involved is the body of god and humans in this formative exchange. In a religious tradition seemingly so opposed to the body, it shocks us to find that important exchanges between god and humans, as depicted by the biblical literature, were about bodies. Yet, even here I feel slightly embarrassed that these ideas surprise me. After all, god is traditionally thought of in male gendered terms. God from the get go is a speaker and speech is physically a bodied action, and language, as we have learned, makes sense only in bodied terms. God's initial statement "let there be light" is clearly a projection into a made world of bodily attributes, specifically that there are bodied eyes to see. Our images of Adam and Eve are images of naked and gendered and sexual bodies. Among the first acts of these ancient parents were making garments to cover their genitalia. As we reflect on these first makings, we begin to realize that this action is exemplary of all that has followed. At this very point in human religious evolution (from a Judeo-Christian perspective) we might utter that stock phrase, "And the rest is history."

God too created human beings in his own image, as scripture tells us. Thus, god's creation of the world must surely be motivated in the same way as is human making, that is, out of pain and desire according to one's own nature. The Christian innovation was to take the embodiment of god all the way to incarnation; to giving god a human body—a male one, of course—so that this drama could be played out in deeper, more profound, and more bizarre ways.

Artifact artifice, I like these words. Artifact refers to a human made object, especially an object that is made with a view to subsequent use. Thus the term artifact reflects Scarry's "hinge effect" of human making. We also think of artifact as the remains of such an object, a shard of pottery, for example, that reveals the makings of others. Artifact often implies being made by hand, but can include mass produced objects. And, of course, artifact is human-made, not natural. Now the term "artifice" is even more fascinating to me. The word has two primary meanings. The first suggests ingenuity and an artful stratagem. Artifice is cleverness and artful skill. However, the second use of the term suggests something more on the order of a trick; it can designate a false or insincere behavior. Thus artifice is a term that catches some interesting shades of value associated with making: the extension of our bodies, the manifestation of our body images, through ingenuous artful creative extensions and

³ "The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man" (an unfinished essay)

projections, but also the falseness, the emptiness, the made-upness of objects and makings. In terms of art, the term artifice catches that interplay between the object made to cleverly reflect back on the world and the obvious, yet unacknowledged, fact that art is made up, a trick, a lie.

Scarry boldly describes god as the Original Artifact, suggesting a projection of the human body on the prime Agent, who may then return the favor.

Another energy I find in the word artifice is that it suggests in its mixture of values an indeterminacy that accompanies making, that is, the relationship between maker and thing made. Thing made is a projection of the body. Thing made hinges back to remake the maker. In neurology I think this would be considered a feedback loop. The indeterminacy is in the understanding of where lies the agency; who indeed is in control? Negatively, we may feel overwhelm; positively, we may enjoy the creative play. From a theological point of view these concerns may suggest the endless question of the presence of “free will.”⁴ In the terms of the human sciences we may think of the issue primarily in terms of “agency.” And, we may be surprised to learn, as considered by Shaun Gallagher,⁵ that this has also been an issue of neuroscience. I actually think that the discussion here is a bit silly. Neuroscientists, such as Benjamin Libet, have shown that our actions are often initiated by neurological processes that occur well before (something on the order of several hundred milliseconds) the actor has an awareness of even the intention of such actions. On the basis of this demonstration, some have argued for a pure determinism. I suppose this means that we are but mechanistic programmed beings whose every action is a reaction to the world around us based on neurological determined patterns set through human evolution; that nothing we do is a result of our willful determination. Gallagher reframes the matter into larger than microsecond intervals to argue for the existence of agency and willfulness. What is clear is that human beings are remarkably complex and invariably distinctive as comprised of a number of complex interacting systems, some totally hardwired, yet many malleable by cultural and individual agency and action. We must thank god—who we now know had a body and needed to think about all these things (or we made him with these characteristics)—that we don’t have to consciously direct our every motor function. Had we to live this way, we would spend most of the morning just grasping a coffee cup, getting the coffee into our bodies, and processing the liquid to extract the caffeine.

The issue of free will and the matter of automatic unconscious bodily processes aside, there is something important to contemplate in the matter that Gallagher introduces. We often do know some things viscerally before we have conscious awareness. We can confirm this by simply reflecting on what happens when someone asks us a difficult question. When we pause to do what we often call “think about” our response, the locus of our processing is often more in our feelings, our gut, our viscera, rather than in our head. We are usually first aware of a pervasive feeling and rather than await the clarity that we are cognitively aware of the entire details of the argument and are sure that we can accurately get to the end when we begin speaking we actually begin answering when we feel that a direction is open to us, a direction that is consistent with the character of our feeling. The time gap then

⁴ Freewill needs to also be addressed in terms of neuroplasty. I will do this later in terms of the insights I am gleaning from Jonah Lehrer’s discussion of George Eliot and relevant recent neuro-scientific findings..

⁵ Shawn Gallagher, *How the Body Shapes the Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

may be evidence that our knowing is not exclusively in our brains in our skulls, but, minimally, at least dispersed throughout the body. That we think and know with our viscera in different sorts of terms than we think and know in our “interpreter” brain. We actually already know this. The entire right hemisphere works more in these terms. We need to acknowledge the importance of the neurology that is spread throughout our bodies and we need to better understand the role of emotion, feeling, passion in this process.

Swimming happily around in the lake of making and artifice we encounter splashing around making far too many waves for our comfort, a rather odd Frenchman, obscure, bold, almost downright nasty spewing about pornography and gendered values and production and, frankly, god knows what. Surely, were he to let us, we’d simply swim on by. Yet, if we tread water nearby we may experience something on the scale of a tsunami.

I’ve read Jean Baudrillard many times, not only this book, *Seduction*,⁶ but many of his others. Each reading has a different effect on me. This time through this section of his book I was pretty constantly irritated by him. Not yet sure why, maybe because of the, to me, unnecessary tedium and obscurity. Still, I cannot help but feel a powerful impact from some of what I think he may be saying. In terms of our present topic of making and agency and power and production, I am caught (abducted) by his introduction of a contrast between production and seduction. It is an amazingly rich and provocative, yet difficult and opaque, idea.

Let me just note a few things Baudrillard writes about seduction and production:

- “All masculine power is a power to produce The only, and irresistible, power of femininity is the inverse power of seduction. In itself it is nul (sic), seduction has no power of its own, only that of annulling the power of production. But it always annuls the later.”⁷
- “It is femininity that incarnates reversibility, the possibility of play and symbolic involvement.”⁸
- “seduction is an ironic, alternative form, one that breaks the referentiality of sex and provides a space, not of desire, but of play and defiance.”⁹
- “Seduction is stronger than power because it is reversible and mortal, while power, like value, seeks to be irreversible, cumulative and immortal. Power partakes of all the illusions of production, and of the real; it wants to be real, and so tends to become its own imaginary, its own superstition (with the help of theories that analyze it, be they to contest it). Seduction, on the other hand, is not of the order of the real—and is never of the order of force, nor relations of force. But precisely for this reason, it enmeshes all power’s *real* actions, as well as the entire reality of production, in this unremitting reversibility and disaccumulation—*without which there would be neither power nor accumulation.*”¹⁰

⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979)

⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 46.

- “Seduction is stronger than production. . . . It is a circular, reversible process of challenges, one-upmanship and death.”¹¹

Perhaps it is not easy to clearly understand Baudrillard on seduction, yet, as he shows us, the grasping for clarity and finality—for the end of play, as Derrida¹² put it—is masculine and this drives production. Still, exerting our masculinity a bit, this is in some sense the problem of Archimedes who declared, “Give me a place to stand on and I’ll move the world.”¹³ Power, the power to make, cannot simply exist sufficiently of itself. Power can be only if there is something other than, outside of, power. This alternative to power must, itself, not be power or powerful. Yet, as Baudrillard writes without this alternative there would be neither power nor accumulation. We desperately want to grasp (using our thumbs) this alternative, yet Baudrillard makes it difficult for us. He calls it “seduction.” It can be neither thing, nor force. He describes it, insofar as he does so, as reversibility, as circular (we might say oscillatory), as play, as defiance, as outside reason and desire and force. Seduction is stronger than production. Seduction is feminine; production masculine.

Trying to understand seduction reminds me a bit of that story of the Iroquois woman who, after listening to a lecture on relativity and cosmology, told the scientist that the Iroquois world was created on the back of a tortoise. The scientist, amused by her remark, asked, “But what does the turtle rest on?” She quickly and confidently answered, “Its turtles all the way down.” Does it matter at all that production, power, agency are of value only in there also existing an alternative? Baudrillard understands our world as production run amuck; that making and the hinged effects of the made on the maker have become so accelerated, so rampant, that there has finally come to be no grounding at all. All is feedback. All is self-reflection. Humans are as much artifice (artificial, clever, and false) as what they have made. Humans are as much or more products of what the world has produced as they are producers of things in the world. In his view, all has become hyperreal, more than real, real to such an extent that all of the distinctions have collapsed between real and unreal, maker and made. And in such a world no wonder pornography is rampant, with male makers seeking some final evidence, through an ultra-close-up view, that sex is real. As Baudrillard writes, “Pornography says: there must be good sex somewhere, for I am its caricature. In its grotesque obscenity, it attempts to save sex’s truth and provide the faltering sexual model with some credibility.”¹⁴

For Baudrillard the counterpart of pornography that exemplifies production is transvestitism which he believes exemplifies seduction. Transvestitism is, in his view, not about gender and sexuality, but about the pure play of signs. It is about an endless interplay of appearances.

Applied to the academic world, I think it is fairly clear that what we do is aligned with production, with the masculine. We interpret, we examine, we analyze, we provide answers, we create minds, we

¹¹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹² Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge, pp 278-294.

¹³ Cited in Smith, “The Influence of Symbols upon Social Change,” in *Map is Not Territory* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 129.

¹⁴ Baudrillard, p. 35.

accumulate knowledge, we win football games. We increasingly think of students and knowledge as product. Though physically subtle, our makings are projections into the world of our ideal understanding of our minds. When we then see these productions—especially in the form of writing—they reveal much to us. They express what we desire to be the character of our minds. Academic writing conventions and practices produced by the mind are a hinge that helps create the mind. The desired distinctions are: clarity, control, objectivity, finality, orderliness, sensibility, authority, power, completeness, concreteness, innovation, and all of these enduring in plain black and white. The hinge, in Scarry's terms, would be that written documents reproduced through publication may, in turn, inform and shape the minds of many others. And a glance around the academy shows that it works. Yet, given the recent studies of the brain and its propensity to clever artifice, our brains, our body/minds, are anything but distinguished by the qualities of our writings. Academic work may then be seen as the masculine attempt to produce a mind quite different from what we actually possess, a process motivated perhaps as much as anything by the unmet desire to have such a mind. A desire that we have endeavored for two centuries to produce, all the while dismissing the body as of any but vehicular value. We still hope that the academic works we make will hinge back on us to give us the kind of minds we desire. Or perhaps academic products serve to veil gut understanding of the actual workings of the mind.

I was rather surprised in reading Scarry this time that she makes little to no reference to movement in her discussion of making. While I need develop this idea much more fully at another time, it is important to outline it here. André Leroi-Gourhan was a paleoethnographer who studied the earliest human-made tools, but he did so in terms of the gestural patternings that were inseparable from the use of the tool. He looked at human evolution and identifies the point when upright posture allowed greater importance of the hand (and, of course, the thumb) and the face to the human distinctiveness. The hand in particular was, he argues, the first tool (and it is shared in some respects by some animals). He began to appreciate that it is the movement patterns of body and body parts that conjoin with tools that begins to distinguish humans and fully emerges when humans began gestural patterns that produced the external storage of memory, from cave art to iPads. Following this consideration, making then aligns with the extension of the human moving body into the world, an act of transcendence, one might even suggest a joyful act of transcendence, rather than an act motivated by the pain of unmet need. Things made, rather than modeled upon the human physical body, would then be better understood as an aspect of human gesturing.

Thus, for the standard example of chair, chairs wouldn't be made because people suffer pain if they don't have something to sit on, but rather that the bodily posture and gestural patterns of sitting are creatively completed by the making of a chair. The hinge, that Scarry introduces, would in this other model be actually the other side of the gesture, the touch side. It is where gesture encounters the world both in an act of making that world real and accessible in the terms of the human anatomy and also discovering the world in those same terms. We learn about ourselves by making chairs as we also learn about the world. We extend our humanness into the world thus making the world our own. This notion would replace Scarry's rather melancholy understanding that we make things and bestow upon them some attributes of sentience that we might not suffer the pain of being the lone sentients of the world.

So in light of this outlined perspective on making, what of Baudrillard's seduction? I'll need to think a great deal more about this, but my gut is telling me that it would shift our understanding of Baudrillard's seduction. I suspect that as we begin to pursue this whole perspective, we'll begin to see seduction as something like the energetics, the promise, the incipience, the inspiration that is always attached to things made, yet is itself no thing. I think we'll find that we can't comprehend seduction apart from production, apart from the stuff we make. That seduction rather than offering reversibility which is absent in production is rather the reversibility that is always present in stuff made, if for no other reason than that anything that can be made can be lost or destroyed or used in unexpected ways or have unpredictable consequences. Things made are never what they appear to be or what they were made to be, thus asserting the constant presence of seduction. Productions are inseparable from the gestural/movement/touch loops that are forever innovative and plastic and creative. Production and seduction are not distinguished in terms of strength or power, as Baudrillard focuses on. Rather their distinction is but one of perspective, which side—masculine or feminine—of the gestural/movement loop one focuses on. This does not mean that we are not a thoroughly masculine society in that we intend our gestures to make real things that stand as truths and are dependable because they are material. This is the aspect of movement and gesture we refer to by the term "agency." Yet, all things made are a reaching out to connect, to explore, to inquire, to discover, to touch and this side of the loop always reverses the values and motivations of the masculine limited understanding of making. So should I be pushed to clarify the gendered distinction associated with production and seduction that Baudrillard introduces, I would say that the masculine aspect is the outward externalizing aspect of gesture and movement, while the feminine aspect embraces that this thrusting making aspect of gesturing is always inseparable from the loop that complements and completes the gestural pattern. It is the latter that clearly is the more sophisticated and valued understanding in that it not only makes the world but it discovers the world, it not only makes us human, but discovers our humanity.

This is but an outline here; clearly my objective is that we need to reconstruct an understanding of making centering on gesture and movement.

To finish what can never be finished, I want to take the discussion of making, action, artifice, production as background for thinking through things with which I am personally concerned.

As you all know, I am fascinated with dancing. I think that we can understand some interesting things about dancing when seen in light of this discussion of making and production. Clearly our culture devalues dancing. It is not a topic commonly taught in schools. It would be difficult to find anyone who would insist that we should spend money and time teaching dancing on a par with science and math, or even social studies and literature, or even art and music. Where does dance fit in a world directed by masculine powerful production? The answer is simple: dance is valued to the degree it is seen as masculine powerful production. Yet, what does dancing produce? In the most immediate sense, dancing produces nothing beyond the body of the dancers dancing. One certainly could argue that there is some existence of a dance beyond the dancing, say the classical ballet "Sleeping Beauty." This may be true of choreographed art performance dancing, but it isn't for all the rest of the world's dancing. There is no parallel artifact like a play script for theatre; no score as with music. Dance

notation is not viable since it cannot be read and produces no kinesthetic images. Dancing is distinctive for its relationship to making. It is a making where what is made is bodily identical with the maker. The dancer is the dance, in some important respects. Where is the hinge? Where is the multiplier effect, especially for non-art non-performance dancing?

But what of dancing as art, as performance, as done for an audience, as a product of culture, of high culture? Interestingly, such forms of dancing are usually uncomfortable products of masculine makings (even if not done by male dancers). Notice the terminology that has come to be associated with these accepted forms of dance. They are done by “companies” of dancers. The company puts on “productions.” Choreographers typically refer these days to their creative process as “making work.” The results of choreography are themselves referred to as “works.” The economic side of this type of dancing is prominent. Audiences pay to watch. Programs tell audiences the meanings and stories of the dances. Advertising and promotion are extensive. And so on. Even with all these terminological adjustments and masculinizations to fit a world driven by productivity, dancing remains an uncomfortable fit. Few dance companies really make it; few dancers actually earn a living. And, notably, dancing, even of this type, is only rarely associated with masculinity and masculine sexuality. Baryshnikov is a rare exception.

All this would seem depressing and hopeless, yet Baudrillard’s work seems to offer some insight. Might we rethink dancing in terms of seduction? Could we comprehend dancing in these terms? Were dancing to be aligned with seduction as Baudrillard presents it, it would not be productive, nor would it necessarily have fixed meanings. It would not project something onto made objects to meet the desire caused by a lack. Dancing would be in one aspect reversible and circular and mortal and powerless and without meaning. What could be more exemplary of reversibility than dancing where the same object, the body, is maker and thing made, is both dance and dancer. It is always reversed when the music ends. Yet, dancing would also be stronger than production, stronger for not having meaning, for not making anything, for not producing artifact. Dancing would be foundational in important ways to production. Dancing would be understood as perhaps the last surviving experience of the idea of reality in a world of hyperreality.

My work in developing dance theory moves in this direction. It takes stock of such cultural examples as the Hindu figure of Nataraja, whose dancing encompasses, but is not the producer of, creation, destruction, preservation, and materiality; Nataraja, whose dancing is understood as play (*lila*), as for nothing, as without meaning, yet stronger than all of these.

My personal dance interest is not in performance, art, high-cultural forms, but rather in social dancing. I want here to return to the thumb. Salsa, as most social dancing, is done by male-female partnering couples. The dance is based on a simple basic rhythm patterned combination of steps. On this foundation, the improvisational dance is built (notice the language of making) up from just a few conventional elements of movement. Traditionally teaching the dance involves establishing the rhythm patterned basic steps and then teaching combinations of the movement elements. In my teaching, the males who are invariably the leads, are obsessed with learning moves. This is very consistent with the values of our society. The best dancers are those with the most moves, or so it seems most believe.

Moves are seen as external productions. Actions intended to impress one's dance partner; and, of course, make other males envious. In my experience, women, the follows, are mostly taught to anticipate the lead, often through rather obvious external signs, including even some guy's tendency to actually verbally tell the woman what he is about to do. Teaching in this way, which I did for many years, I was always shocked to see the results of my work. Good dancers I was rarely making. I was disturbed to see the jerky, conflicted, awkward, almost violent and hurtful appearance of these dancers. I would see guys wrestle and drag their partners through some complex moves, awkwardly executed and almost always lacking any connection with the rhythm in the music. Were I to consider this process in the terms we have been discussing here, I'd have to say that this is masculine dancing oriented toward production. It is directed to males making something to fulfill a felt lack, to meet an unmet desire. This kind of dancing as social dancing displaces social connection with demonstration; partnering with controlling and overpowering manipulation. It is male centered, despite the unnoticed fact that it is only the skill and intuition of the women that make it anything other than painful disaster.

I shifted the way I teach several years ago. While I still teach complex move patterns—I'm a North American male after all—I have begun to place a large amount of attention on partner connection. What I am interested in teaching is the skill of two people physically connecting through touch (and many other connectivities). This is the sort of touching that is subtle, requiring only the lightest of physical contact, but where the two bodies are focused on the interconnection. The connection is one of equality of force and opposition: push against push, pull against pull. It is a skill that clearly works at the subconscious sensorimotor skill level and requires response times of nanoseconds. It is a connection that might be described as like a bungee cord, because of the progressive increasing and decreasing forces that are exactly met by the two dancers. Here is where the thumb comes in. In the male dominating move making style of dancing, men often connect with their partners by firmly holding their hands using the thumb to assure the connection. Men dancing this way grasp their partners with their thumbs powerfully engaged so as to better control and use the woman as a tool of their exhibition. The use of thumbs in this context says it all.

The innovations of technique I apply to teaching dancing is to never—well, almost never—allow the use of thumbs. Rather the guy's middle finger tips are placed on the woman's palm where her middle finger meets her palm. Male middle finger or two to the middle of the female's inner hand, without thumbs, the dancers must focus carefully on connection, maintaining a connection, on connective interaction and movement. Leading and following must become interdependent, co-equal, interactive, subtle, sensitive. Leading and following require constant feedback looping or play. Touch and touching are the foundation of the connection. The resulting dancing is very different. The dance is focused primarily on the physical connection. Moves, or movement combinations, arise out of this connection rather than out of male productiveness. Sensitivity to the connection demands that the dancing is compatible with the experience both dancers have in connecting and maintaining the connection. Dancers trained in this way find the experience of dancing very different: smooth, social, interactive, sensuous, playful, and, yes, seductive. Such an approach is also interesting from the perspective of making. While I have said that making dance, particularly in the non-art non-performance sense of dancing, is when the thing made is the same as the maker. This reversibility is equivalent to an experience of what Baudrillard is

referring to as seduction. Now, in the social dance setting dance and dancer are two persons, not one. So what of the reversibility here? What is involved in the dance and dancer being one body? Well, when the dance is done with thumbs, with the masculine intent to produce, there is no reversibility; there is only the male thrusting forward controlling the female bent on showing, making, impressing. However, without thumbs, the two move as one, with fluidity, with grace, with ease. There are two, yet in their connection, they experience a oneness; they experience a reversibility; they play with one another, without meaning or goal or product.